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COMMENTS
This is a good example of the uncritical application of gen-
eral legal doctrine to a tax case. The recitals in the contract
as to the removability of the elevators and equipment and as
to title were inserted for security reasons. They have no
bearing whatever on the determination as to whether the
taxpayer is to be treated, for retail sales tax purposes, as the
consumer of the cages, cables, shafts, etc. which go into an
elevator installation . . . whatever the solution to be
reached, it should not be determined by the niceties of the
law of the title.16
CHARLES C. ALLEN III
TORTS-LIABILITY OF RESTAURANT OWNER FOR DEATH RE-
SULTING FROM EATING POISONED FOOD UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE--QUANTUM OF PROOF. Plaintiff and her husband be-
came ill two hours after eating a meal of corned beef in the
defendant-restaurant. Plaintiff brought suit against the res-
taurant under the Mississippi wrongful death statute for the
death of her husband, who died of ptomaine poisoning eight days
after eating the corned beef. The trial judge directed a verdict
for the defendant after the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the judgement of the trial
court, ruling that the plaintiff did not prove a prima facie case of
negligence for submission to a jury. The court said that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur4 could not be applied to food bacteria
cases, and that there was no evidence from which a jury could
find that the defendant was negligent in preparing the food, or
that the defendant's negligence caused the death of the plaintiff's
husband. The court further held that there could be no recovery
on the basis of a breach of an implied warranty because the war-
ranty did not survive to the wife upon the death of her husband.1
There are two theories upon which recovery for injury caused
by the presence of a deleterious substance in food may be based:
(1) negligence on the part of the dispenser of the food,2 and (2)
breach of an implied warranty.3 Recovery, of course, may always
be had if the plaintiff is able to prove negligence, but because of
16. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation, 1947 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
AMERICAN LAw 321 (1948).
1. Goodwin v. Misticos et aL, 42 So.2d. 397 (Miss. 1949).
2. Note, 7 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1949).
3. Ibid.
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the difficulties encountered in proving negligence in this type of
case, a more liberal doctrine has developed whereby the inn-
keeper is held impliedly to warrant that the food he serves is
wholesome and free from deleterious substances.4
In the line with this liberal attitude, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has held that the dispenser of food impliedly warrants
that the food and water he serves are free from deleterious sub-
stances.3 In the principal case, however, the court refused re-
covery on any implied warranty theory because of a prior Missis-
sippi decision to the effect that such an action was ex contractu,
that contract actions survive to the executor or administrator
and not the widow and that any recovery under the wrongful
death statute must be based on a tort to the deceased. Thus,
since the breach of warranty was not delictual in its nature, it
could not serve as a basis for a recovery under a wrongful death
statute.6 Consequently plaintiff was forced to recover on a
negligence theory or not at all.
In negligence actions for injuries resulting from the consump-
tion of deleterious food, three general classifications of the cases
may be formulated: (1) those which hold that the sale of dele-
terious food constitutes a violation of a pure food and drug act,
in which case the legal conclusion is either that such conduct
constitutes negligence per se, or more properly, that the in-fact
violation of such a statute results in absolute civil liability as
well as criminal liability ;7 (2) those which hold that the plaintiff
makes out a prima facia case of negligence when he offers proof
that food procured from the defendant was unwholesome, and
that illness resulted therefrom;8 and (3) those which hold that
4. Ibid.
5. Sartin v. Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579, 23 So.2d 222 (1946) (liability for
injuries sustained by patron in swallowing broken glass contained in water
served to patron is not restricted to that of negligence but may be predicated
upon the breach of an implied warranty; a restaurateur's implied warranty
is based upon justifiable reliance by the patron upon the skill and judgment
of the -restaurateur.)
6. Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So.2d 791 (1944)(demurrer by defendant sustained on the ground that Miss. CODE §1453
[1942] does not give a cause of action arising ex contractu affirmed).
7. 22 Am. JuR. FOOD §100 (1939) note, 7 A.L.R.2d 1040 (1949); Boyls-
ton v. Armour & Co., 196 S.C. 1, 12 S.E.2d 34 (1940); Clark Restaurant Co.
v. Simmons, 29 Ohio App. 220, 163 N.E. 210 (1927).
8. 22 Am. JuR. FOOD §102 (1939); Panza v. Bickfords Inc. of N.J., 129
N.J.L. 50, 28 A.2d 188 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (presence of a metal slugjustified an inference of negligence in the preparation of the pie) ; Rickner
v. Ritz Restaurant Co. of Passaic, 13 N.J. Misc. 818, 181 At]. 398 (Sup. Ct.
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the plaintiff makes out a prima facia case of negligence when he
offers proof that he consumed deleterious food dispensed by the
defendant from which illness resulted (all that is required under
the second class of cases above), and when he offers affirmative
evidence of the defendant's particular acts of negligence in the
preparation of the food.9
In the instant case, the Mississippi court chose to follow the
rule as laid down in the cases of the third classification. The
court gave two grounds for its choice: first, since the fact of
negligent preparation is capable of direct and demonstrative
proof, it cannot be inferred from the fact of unwholesomeness;
and second, the fact of causal connection is also capable of direct
and demonstrative proof, and cannot be inferred from the fact
of unwholesomeness. The court refused to permit the use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in proving the fact of negligent
preparation of the food, flatly stating that the res ipsa doctrine
is not applicable to food poisoning cases. However, res ipsa has
been used in cases where foreign, inanimate objects, such as
chipped glass, 0 toothpicks," and a small metal slug,' 2 are present
in the food. Such an application of the doctrine seems proper
because while the food is not in the exclusive control of the de-
fendant at all times when the foreign object could have gotten
into the food, nevertheless, the high standard of care imposed
on food-dispensers indicates that failure to discover such an ob-
ject, regardless of its source, would constitute a breach of the
defendant's duty of inspection. Thus the exclusive control re-
quirement, so essential in res ipsa cases, would be satisfied. But
in a case like the principal one, the presence of bacteria in food
cannot be discovered except by an inspection by an expert with
1935); Chisholm v. S. S. Kresge Co., 55 R.I. 422, 182 Atl. 4 (1935); Corin
v. S. S. Kresge, 110 N.J.L. 378, 166 Atl. 291 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) (New
Jersey cases hold restaurateur to a duty of reasonable care in the preparation
of food and the presence of an injurious foreign substance in such food is
held to justify an inference of negligence). Clark Restaurant Co. v. Rau,
41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196 (1931); George's Restaurant v. Dukes, 216
Ala. 239, 113 So. 53 (1927); Copeland v. Curtis, 136 S.E. 324 (Ga. App.
1926).
9. 22 AM. JuR. FOOD §114-116 (1939); Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231
Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396 (1918).
10. Clark Restaurant Co. v. Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196 (1931).
11. Black v. Childs Co. of Providence, 58 A.2d 115 (R.L 1948).
12. Panza v. Bickfords Inc. of New Jersey, 129 N.J.L. 50, 28 A.2d 188
(Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
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a microscope. To place such a burden on the dispenser of food
would be unreasonable. Thus, there is at least one justifiable
distinction between cases applying the doctrine of res ipsa and
the present case. Since, in the instant case, the presence of the
bacteria could not have been reasonably detected, the bacteria
might well have been present in the ingredients at the time the
defendant received them from the wholesaler. In that event, the
defendant would not have had the exclusive control necessary for
the application of res ipsa. Inasmuch as the presence of bac-
teria cannot be discerned by a reasonable inspection, and since
the bacteria may be present at the time the dispenser receives the
food, the doctrine of res ipsa should have no general application
in cases where the unwholesomeness is due to bacteria in the
food.
The court further ruled that although there was a basis for an
inference that the food was unwholesome when eaten, this in-
ference cannot be the basis for a further inference that the eat-
ing of the contaminated corned beef caused the death of the
deceased. In its conclusion that the plaintiff did not show that
the eating of the food caused the husband's death, the court was
strongly influenced by the fact that proof of such causal relation-
ship could have been easily established by a chemical analysis.
Some justification for the court's conclusion may be found in the
fact that the deceased lived for eight days, six of which were
spent in a clinic, after eating the corned beef. It would seem that
while the proof of the type desired by the court may be obtained,
it has been held in other cases not to be required ;13 and even in
the absence of such proof, the inference which the plaintiff asked
the court to draw was a most reasonable one under the circum-
stances. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, in cases of this
sort, as well as in negligence cases generally,14 the usual rule is
that the plaintiff need only produce evidence from which the
jury may find an in-fact causal connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, and it is not incumbent
13. Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La. App. 1939) (plaintiff was
not required to have a chemical analysis made).
14. Palmer v. Rosedale Catering Co., 195 So. 859 (La. App. 1940); Black
v. Childs Co. of Providence, 58 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1948) ; Danker et al. V. Fischer
Baking Co., 5 N.J. Super. 248, 68 A.2d 774 (1949); Ward Baking Co. v.
Frizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 325 (1928) (presence of a needle in
the cake bearing the name of Ward Baking Co. is an evidential fact from
which negligence may be inferred).
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on the plaintiff to exclude all other possible sources of injury. 5
Assuming that the court was correct in not applying the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, but that the court was incorrect in
its strict requirements of proof to establish a causal connection,
there still remains the necessity of proving that the defendant
was guilty of negligence in preparing and failing to inspect the
food. It is submitted that the plaintiff did prove a prima
facie case when uncontroverted evidence was introduced which
gave rise to an inference of unwholesomeness. Such an inference
indicates negligence whether in the inspection or the prepara-
tion of the food. To hold that the defendant was not negligent
in his inspection does not justify the holders that the defendant
was not negligent in the preparation of the food. Clearly, some-
one was negligent before the plaintiff and her husband ate the
food. Although it is true the special requirements for the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine are not present, the defendant should have
been called upon to produce evidence that he used due care in
preparing the food, and in inspecting it. Especially is this true
in view of the fact that the plaintiff herself noticed that the food
did not taste right and did not eat it.16 If there was something
about the food which suggested unwholesomeness to a layman,
that would seem to be enough of a basis on which to shift the
burden of producing evidence to the defendant, who must be
held to have more ability, as well as a greater duty, to detect
unwholesomeness in food. Surely the defendant was in a better
position to offer evidence as to the care used than was the plain-
tiff. Defendant should have been called upon to go ahead with
that evidence. The defendant was not entitled to a directed ver-
dict, but should have been required to produce evidence as to the
care that he used in the preparation of the food. The issues
should have been presented to a jury for determination.
JOSEPH A. MURPHY
15. Johnson v. Kanavos, 296 Mass. 373, N.E.2d 434 (1937) (plaintiffs
must show that food was probably the cause, but they need not exclude
every other possible cause).
16. C. C. Hooper Cafe Co. v. Henderson, 223 Ala. 579, 137 So. 419 (1931);
Johnson v. Kanavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E.2d. 434 (1937); McCarley v.
Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934); Lee v. Smith et al.,
168 So. 727 (La. App. 1936).
Washington University Open Scholarship
